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Infringement of patents for new uses of known
drugs: lessons from recent cases
William van Caenegem BOND UNIVERSITY
Points to consider
• Patents for new therapeutic uses of known drugs
or new dosage regimes are commonly granted in
Australia.
• Some recent federal court decisions indicate that
such patents might be infringed in multiple ways.
• Infringement can be by doctors prescribing drugs
for certain conditions, or by generic drug manu-
facturers supplying drugs for the purpose of treat-
ing those conditions.
• Drug manufacturers may be liable because of the
terms of the PDI, or because they had reason to
believe that the drug would be prescribed by
doctors for a condition covered by the patent.
Introduction
In Australia, a patent may be granted for a new
therapeutic use of a known drug, or for new dosage
regimes or administrations of known drugs. This article
looks at three recent cases where the Federal Court
considered what amounts to infringement of these pat-
ents. They are infringed only if the medication is
prescribed or supplied for the new therapeutic purpose
(a new indication), and not if they are prescribed to treat
some other condition.
In a typical situation, infringement of such a process
patent for prescription medication can arise in different
ways, such as by breach of s 117 of the Patents Act 1990
(Cth) if the pharmaceutical company (often a generic
manufacturer) supplies the medication with instructions
(a PDI) to prescribe it for the new indication, or having
reason to believe that it would be prescribed for the new
indication. This is known as infringement by supply.
Alternatively, the supplier may infringe by having
authorised the infringing use (s 13 of the Patents Act
prescribes that a patent can be infringed by exploitation
or by authorising another to exploit it), or as a joint
tortfeasor with the prescribing doctor. Also, a doctor
who prescribes medication to a patient is held to exploit
the patent directly, and thus infringes if not authorised to
prescribe it for that particular treatment purpose. This is
despite the fact that the doctor neither makes nor directly
supplies the medication, nor necessarily knows whether
the patient obtains and takes the medication as pre-
scribed. Because such process patents cover a method of
prescribing a drug, the actual patient taking the drug,
even for an indication covered by the patent, would not
infringe.
This article particularly considers s 117 infringement
by supply and also infringement by a prescribing doctor,
in light of the decisions in:
• Apotex Pty Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis Australia Pty Ltd
(No 2);1
• Generic Health Pty Ltd v Otsuka Pharmaceutical
Co Ltd; and2
• Apotex Pty Ltd v AstraZeneca AB (No 4).3
Infringement of process patents for new
indications
A process patent, being a patent that covers a practi-
cal process or method rather than a product, can be
infringed by implementing the method or process with-
out authority (ie, by “exploitation”), or by supplying
products to a person for use in a manner covered by the
patent (s 117, infringement by supply). Some patents
also claim new methods of prescribing drugs (eg, new
dosage regimes) for known therapeutic purposes. Such
patents are thought to be a significant incentive for
pharmaceutical companies to conduct research and devel-
opment into improved use or hitherto unknown thera-
peutic benefits of known drugs. Both infringement by
exploitation and infringement by supply in such circum-
stances have recently been considered in a number of
Federal Court cases.
In Apotex v Sanofi-Aventis, the claim was for a
process consisting of the administration of the known
substance leflunomide by a medical practitioner for the
treatment of psoriasis. The substance was previously
known and used for the treatment of arthritic conditions.
The application of leflunomide in accordance with the
patent thus necessarily involved diagnosis of psoriasis
by a medical practitioner and prescription of the drug for
its treatment.
Thus, a medical practitioner who prescribes leflunomide
for arthritis would not infringe the relevant patent, but
one who prescribes it for psoriasis (a skin condition)
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would infringe the patent if not authorised by the
patentee to do so. Importantly, the medical practitioner
would be a primary infringer in those circumstances,
guilty of exploiting the patent without authority, rather
than an infringer by supply under s 117 of the Patents
Act. In practice, whether or not the patent is infringed
would largely depend on who prescribes it: therefore, a
dermatologist prescribing leflunomide would infringe
the patent, whereas most likely a rheumatologist who
does so would not.
The additional complication in this case was that
psoriasis and the rheumatic condition PsA often present
together in a patient. However, according to the Full
Court, a rheumatologist who prescribes leflunomide for
a rheumatic condition, where the drug would also
ameliorate psoriasis, would not infringe the patent because
of the fact alone that the administration also had a
clinically beneficial result relating to psoriasis (in this
the Full Court overturned the trial judge’s decision).
Section 117 of the Patents Act (infringement by
supply) specifies that a person may infringe the patent
not by applying the process covered by the claims, but
by supplying products to a party who will put them to
use in the claimed manner (method or process). In this
context, the company supplying the drug rather than the
doctor prescribing it might infringe by supply. But
liability will only ensue if one of a number of conditions
is fulfilled: if the product is only capable of a use that is
patented (s 117(2)(a)); if the product supplied is not a
staple commercial product, and it is put to an infringing
use, as long as the supplier had reason to believe that the
recipient would put it to that use (s 117(2)(b)); and
where there is an infringing use that accords with
instructions or inducements supplied with the product or
contained in an advertisement published by or with the
authority of the supplier (s 117(2)(c)).
In terms of a process patent for the use of a known
compound for a new clinical indication, such as in the
Sanofi-Aventis case, the supplier’s (the pharmaceutical
company’s) liability for infringement by supply will
most often result from instructions or product informa-
tion (PID) contained within or on the packaging of the
drug. In Sanofi-Aventis, the facts indicated that psoriasis
often occurs at the same time as the particular rheumatic
condition (PsA) in a particular patient. In the result, the
court held that:
The appellant’s PID instructed the use of leflunomide in the
treatment of psoriasis which is associated with PsA, as will
commonly be the case. On that basis, s 117(2)(c) is
engaged.4
Further, Keane J held that the contents of the instruc-
tions in the PID also made it apparent that the appellant
(Apotex) also had “reason to believe” (s 117(2)(b)) that
“medical practitioners would put leflunomide to use as a
method of treating psoriasis which is associated with
PsA”.5 The court concluded that s 117 would therefore
be engaged on two grounds: because of the specific
instruction in the PID referred to above; and because the
appellant had reason to believe that the product would
be prescribed in certain cases to treat concurrent psoria-
sis. The reasonable belief could be inferred from the
content of the PID.
What amounts to reasonable belief?
The latter point relating to “reasonable belief” in
s 117(2)(b) is particularly relevant in light of the further
case of Generic Health Pty Ltd v Otsuka Pharmaceuti-
cal Co Ltd.
The claim related to a method of administering to
patients a therapeutically effective amount of the known
drug aripiprazole for the treatment of cognitive impair-
ment in patients suffering from treatment-resistant, invet-
erate or chronic schizophrenia who failed to respond to
two or more of a list of anti-psychotic drugs specified in
the patent claims.
Cognitive impairment is typically treated by atypical
anti-psychotic drugs, but some patients are resistant to
such therapy and, in these cases, the administration of
aripiprazole may be a potent therapy. Here the “reason-
able belief” could not be implied from the PID as in the
Sanofi-Aventis case above. Rather, the reasonable belief
was only based on evidence of a more general kind, it
being established law that no actual belief need be
shown and the section providing that the belief must be
that the product would (not might) be used in an
infringing manner.
In that context, the court stressed that facts were in
evidence that gave rise to a reasonable belief that
aripiprazole was prescribed by doctors to treat the
cognitive impairment schizophrenia sufferers are known
to experience:
The medical evidence addresses the use of aripiprazole in
the treatment of schizophrenia-associated cognitive impair-
ment and the basis of such action. There is evidence that
patients may be “switched” to aripiprazole. This was not a
case of possible hypothetical infringing use. The evidence
established, at a prima facie level, that there was reason to
believe on the part of the supplier, a supplier of pharma-
ceutical products, that it would be put to the claimed use.6
Thus, the evidence that resulted in liability in this
case is much more general in nature than in the
Sanofi-Aventis case. It should be noted that the consid-
eration of the Full Court was in the context of an appeal
against an interlocutory injunction.
Apotex v AstraZeneca
In Apotex v AstraZeneca, the patent related to the use
of rosuvastatin in particular dosages. AstraZeneca (AZ)
relied on s 117 of the Patents Act, but also on joint
intellectual property law bulletin April/May 2013188
tortfeasorship to the extent that “by the act of supply,
[Apotex et al] would be aiding, inducing or procuring
the infringement of the patent by patients who used the
products in issue”.7 Interestingly enough, AZ also sub-
mitted that s 13(1) would be infringed because it
provides that “Subject to this Act, a patent gives the
patentee the exclusive rights, during the term of the
patent, to exploit the invention and to authorise another
person to exploit the invention”, and that such authorisa-
tion had occurred here.
Thus, apart from infringement by exploitation by the
doctor prescribing a drug for a patented indication, and
infringement by supply based on s 117, the decision
suggests that two further forms of infringement may
arise in these types of supply and process patent cases.
This is important for practitioners to keep in mind.
However, here the question of infringement was hypo-
thetical, as the court found the patent to be invalid on a
number of grounds. Nonetheless, it went on to consider
the question of liability obiter.
The court took issue with Keane J’s approach in
Sanofi-Aventis.8 But a question issue arose, in that the
patent in this case was for the administration of a
particularly low dose of the known substance, which
was surprisingly effective in the treatment of extreme
hypertension. Some of the evidence indicated the avail-
ability in pharmacies of pill-splitters, machines that
enable a pill to be cut into smaller parts, thus enabling
the administration of doses smaller than a whole pill. A
generic equivalent pill supplied in a dose that itself
would not be infringing because not falling within the
low-dose patent might in those circumstances become
an infringing supply. That would be the case if the PID
instructed the use of a pill-splitting device, and so on,
but also if the supplier had reason to believe that a
purchaser would split the pills into the lower dosages
falling within the claims.
The court stressed that AZ ultimately had to prove
that a person would use the 40 mg product supplied by
Apotex within the claims of the low dose (5 and 10 mg)
patent, and went on to say that it was ultimately
satisfied:
Given the ease of tablet splitting by using a pill cutter,
whether the tablet be scored or unscored, and the economic
incentives, that there is a risk that some people will obtain
the 20 mg dose of the generic tablets for the purpose of
dividing them into two 10 mg doses. I also infer that this
risk will exist irrespective of any instructions the generic
parties might send to medical practitioners and pharmacists
not to endorse tablet splitting in any way because, ulti-
mately, the obligation of medical practitioners and phar-
macists is to their patients and not to drug companies who
want to try to avoid patent infringements. The risk also
remains despite Apotex’s product information directing
against tablet splitting. [Emphasis added.]9
The court concluded in relation to s 117(2)(c) that:
… on the whole of the evidence, including the proposed
communications with medical practitioners and pharma-
cists, it cannot be said that the generic parties will instruct
or induce any person to split a 20 or 40 mg tablet into two
or four.10
Despite this conclusion, the comments the court
makes in relation to the risk of pill splitting have
potentially far-reaching implications. Even if PID instruc-
tions counsel against the pill splitting practice, it may be
that because medical practitioners would instruct patients
to split pills, taken together with other evidence, the
generic supplier would be held to have had a “reason-
able belief” that the product would be prescribed in a
manner that would infringe the process patent. It should
be noted that the court held that the pharmaceutical
substance was not a staple commercial product: although
it had various uses in relation to hypertension, its uses
did not stretch to treatment of other conditions.
Points from these cases…
These cases thus illustrate a number of points. First,
there is a considerable list of potential heads of liability
where a generic manufacturer supplies medication that
is prescribed for the treatment of a condition as covered
by a process patent:
• prescription of the drug to a patient by the doctor
can amount to primary infringement by exploita-
tion;
• supply of a drug to a doctor with instructions to
use it for treatment of a particular medical indica-
tion that is covered by a method patent may
amount to infringement by supply (s 117);
• supply of a drug where there is reason for the
supplier to believe, from general evidence about
medical knowledge and practice, that it will, at
least in part, be prescribed for a condition covered
by a method patent may amount to infringement
by supply (s 117);
• infringement by authorisation may occur where a
drug is supplied with instructions to use it in a
manner covered by a process patent (primary
infringement (s 13(1)); and
• liability as a joint tortfeasor with the prescribing
doctor where supplying a drug for an infringing
use is also a possibility.
The latter two points have not been further consid-
ered here, but should be kept in mind.
This means that suppliers of generic drugs that have
non-patented and patented uses have to tread very
carefully in terms of the content of their PIDs. If the
obiter statements in the AstraZeneca case are to be given
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any credit, then it may be that in some circumstances, no
matter how carefully drafted the PID is, the supplier of
a generic drug may still be at risk of liability because the
widespread knowledge about the use of a drug for a
certain condition or in a certain manner means that the
conclusion that the supplier had a “reasonable belief”
that it would be put to an infringing use is inescapable.
Medical treatment patents for secondary
indications
On a final point, an issue that recurs in relation to
medical treatment method patents for new uses of
known therapeutic substances is whether such “inven-
tions” actually disclose patentable subject matter. How-
ever, the acceptance of patentability of such secondary
indications is now firmly anchored in Australian patent
case law. The courts refuse to tamper with the present
law, preferring to leave this to parliament. However, as
we know, the parliament in 1990, by retaining the
“manner of manufacture” terminology in s 18 of the
Patents Act, has left the matter firmly in the judges’
court. The manner of manufacture question has also
arisen in the context of the Philips11 threshold test of
invention but, there too, opponents of medical treatment
patents have received little comfort from the courts.
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